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This Article illustrates, through sociolinguistic analysis, how an adjudi-
cator's biases against certain narrative styles can erroneously influence his or
her assessments of credibility, treatment of parties, and decision-making in
the administrative law setting. Poverty lawyers have observed that many
claimants in the administrative state continue to face procedural and discur-
sive obstacles. 2 Applying insights from a growing field of inter-disciplinary
research, including conversation analysis, linguistics, and cognitive studies,
this Article builds upon those observations by more precisely demonstrating
how structural and narrative biases can work to deny an applicant due
process.
In the watershed decision Goldberg v. Kelly,' the United States Su-
preme Court held that receipt of government benefits is a property interest 4
that cannot be denied without timely, effective notice and a meaningful op-
portunity to contest the grounds for the denial.' Though the debates among
scholarS6 and the judiciary7 about what constitutes effective notice or oppor-
tunity to contest a denial in particular situations will persist, applicants de-
' Acting Assistant Professor, New York University Law School. Special thanks to Profes-
sors Lawrence Solan and Minna Kotkin and the New York University Law School 2010 Lawy-
ering Colloquium. Also, thanks to Professors Heidi Kitrosser and Dana Brakman-Reiser for
feedback on early drafts.
2 See, e.g., Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ in Assisting
the Pro Se Litigant, 27 J. NATL AssN ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447 (2007); Barbara Bezdek,
Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Pro-
cess, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Prac-
tice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107 (1991); Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G,
38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990), reprinted in part in CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY: READINGS FOR LIVE-
CLIENT CLINICS 215 (Alex J. Hurder et al. eds., 2nd prtg., 2003).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4 Id. at 262 n.8.
5 Id. at 261.
6 Cf., e.g., Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process
Counterrevolution, 75 DENv. U.L. REV. 9 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996); Jane Rutherford, The Myth
of Due Process, 72 B.U.L. REv. 1, 41 (1992); Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 221, 269 (1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 673-74 (2d. ed. 1988); Lawrence Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedu-
ral Due Process and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323 (1987); JERRY
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 336-37 (1983); JERRY L. MASHAw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 21-23
(1983); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. Ill (1978); Henry P. Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
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nied government benefits today are generally afforded more safeguards than
they were prior to Goldberg.' In the context of disability or unemployment
insurance benefits, applicants can at least expect to know why the benefits
may be denied, to have some opportunity to provide information (usually in
writing) prior to an initial determination, and to be afforded a relatively
prompt post-deprivation hearing with an administrative adjudicator upon
request.
As important as these minimum procedural rights are, however, they
sometimes remain insufficient to ensure administrative due process for many
of those people most affected by the denial of government benefits. The
way parties use and understand language invariably impacts the efficacy of
the procedures in place. As Lucie White has observed, when persons disfa-
vored by race or class employ "verbal strategies" that differ from the "dom-
inant stylistic norms," the available procedural safeguards may be less
effective.9 There is nothing new, of course, about the claim that the law does
not always treat similarly situated persons equally, and law and society
scholars have explored socially-influenced inequalities in the legal system
for at least seventy years. Nevertheless, that research has been "less suc-
cessful at exposing the mechanisms by which inequality is produced." 0
This Article suggests that our understanding of factors that affect ad-
ministrative due process (and whether, in fact, due process is provided) will
be significantly enhanced by closely examining the linguistic and structural
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48-49 (1976); Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
Cf, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (sum-
mary civil forfeiture of real property without exigent circumstances denies due process);
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138 (1990) (post-deprivation tort remedies not sufficient to
protect confined mental patients against possibly erroneous deprivation of liberty); Brock v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987) (motor carrier entitled to notice of employee's
allegations and supporting evidence, opportunity to submit written response, and opportunity
to rebut before Secretary of Labor could order it to temporarily reinstate an employee who was
allegedly discharged for whistle blowing activity); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 (1985) (employees must be given opportunity to respond before termination); Walters
v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) ($10 statutory limit on fees that
may be paid an attorney or agent who represents a veteran seeking benefits does not violate
due process); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (evaluating procedures for allowing parents
to commit their minor children to mental health facility); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (evidentiary hearing is not required prior to termination of disability benefits); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (in non-exigent situations, students facing temporary suspension
from public school must be given notice of charges and an opportunity to present their sides
prior to removal); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires pre-termina-
tion evidentiary hearing before public assistance payments are discontinued). See generally
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
8 See, e.g., Hon. Cesar A. Perales, The Fair Hearing Process: Guardian of the Social
Service System, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 891-92 (1990) (noting that in public assistance cases
alone, the number of hearings requested per year increased from 1300 in the year before
Goldberg was decided to 150,000 in 1989).
9 White, supra note 2 at 4.
1o Robert Dingwall, Language, Law, and Power: Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analy-
sis, and the Politics of Law and Society Studies, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 885, 903 (2000)
[emphasis added].
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details of administrative hearings. A growing handful of socio-legal re-
searchers have drawn upon the tools of conversation analysis (or "talk-in-
interaction")," linguistics, and cognitive studies to begin to map the precise
ways that biases are reflected in, and influenced by, how participants in a
variety of legal settings use language.12 By similarly studying the linguistic
interactions in administrative hearings, we can get a sense of the extent to
which administrative due process is a function of not just procedure, but also
of narrative difference. I hope to contribute to this goal here by closely
exploring, as a case study, the interactive particulars of an unemployment
insurance benefits hearing in New York that I worked on years ago as a
student lawyer.
The reader may question what can be learned from looking closely at a
single unemployment insurance benefit hearing. Foremost, this particular
hearing provides a rich set of data because the contrast between the parties'
use of language - and the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) reactions to
those differing styles - was significant, so much so that his management of
this hearing was later found to have deprived the applicant of due process.
This hearing thus provides fertile opportunity to explore how social and dis-
cursive biases are connected not just motivationally, but linguistically, to
decision-making that implicates fundamental rights.
Even if one remains unconvinced that the applicant in this case study,
who for privacy reasons I refer to as "Ms. S", was denied due process be-
cause of her narrative style, the unemployment benefits hearing as a data set
is still important because it illustrates how the framework and relative lee-
way of the administrative hearing allows adjudicators to exploit (perhaps
even unintentionally) differences in language style, and more fundamentally,
in social class structure, thereby reinforcing unequal power dynamics. Pro-
fessor Gregory Matoesian in particular has shown how social context - in-
cluding race, power and status - is produced and reproduced in and through
talk, including trial talk." In this Article, I demonstrate how the structure of
" See, e.g., GEORGE PSATHAS, CONVERSATION ANALYSIS: THE STUDY OF TALK-IN-INTER-
ACTION 1-3 (1995).
12 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LAN-
GUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005); LANGUAGE IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (Janet Cotterill ed.,
2002); ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000); Shonna L.
Trinch, The Advocate as Gatekeeper: The Limits of Politeness in Protective Order Interviews
with Latina Survivors of Domestic Abuse, 5(4) J. SOCIOLINGUISTICs 475-506 (2001); Calvin
Morrill et al., Telling Tales in School: Youth Culture and Conflict Narratives, 34 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 521 (2000); Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 767 (2000); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS (1998)
[hereinafter "JUST WORDS"]; Calvin Morrill et al., Voice and Context in Simulated Everyday
Legal Discourse: The Influence of Sex Differences and Social Ties, 32 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 639
(1998); Gregory M. Matoesian, Language, Law, and Society: Policy Implications of the Ken-
nedy Smith Rape Trial, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 669 (1995); GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRO-
DUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM (1993) [hereinafter
MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE].
" See GREGORY MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY: DISCOURSE IN THE
WILLIAM KENNEDY SMITH RAPE TRIAL 37-68 (2001) [hereinafter MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE
LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY]; MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE, supra note 12, at 98-188.
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these unemployment benefits hearings too easily allows an ALJ who reacts
negatively to a particular applicant's disfavored narrative style to unfairly
privilege the employer's account and to further disadvantage and dominate
the applicant on a linguistic level. An adjudicator's exploitation of those
who use more marginalized narrative styles, whether intentional or uninten-
tional, reinforces the already lopsided power structure between applicant and
government, and it therefore remains important to reveal how this sort of
linguistic exploitation is realized in context.
Finally, unemployment insurance benefits hearing transcripts, like those
of most administrative hearings, are not a matter of public record and are not
easily accessible. I offer this analysis and data (minimally redacted for pri-
vacy reasons) to pull back the curtain on an area of law that, because it
profoundly affects so many, deserves a closer look. Even a single adminis-
trative hearing provides rich opportunities to employ diverse and useful tools
in legal analysis.14
To situate the discussion that follows, Part I of this paper surveys ad-
ministrative due process doctrine and academic commentary. Part II defines
"narrative style" and provides some relevant theoretical background for the
analysis presented here. Part III lays out a brief explanation of New York's
unemployment insurance benefits scheme and then contrasts administrative
law hearings with trials in civil courts. In Part IV, I explore the hearing in
more minute detail, examining how both the structure of the hearing and the
linguistic interactions between the ALJ and the parties can work to deny
claimants of a fair hearing. Part V concerns post-hearing developments,
namely the AL's written decision denying benefits to Ms. S, and then her
successful appeal of that decision on due process grounds. Finally, Part VI
offers concluding thoughts about potential remedies and the need for further
research in this area.
I. WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS?
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that procedural due
process is a flexible concept." This flexibility is essential given the wide
range of applications to which courts must apply a single constitutional
clause.' 6 Nevertheless, in all contexts where liberty or property may be le-
gally deprived, we can identify some fundamental components of the pro-
1On a personal level, there is additionally great pedagogical value in revisiting one's
legal successes and failures and deeply reflecting on what was done well, what could have
been done better or differently, and how our past strategies and understandings compare to
present thinking. There are always more layers of meaning to unfold and engaging in this sort
of periodic review and critique is, I believe, extremely beneficial to professional growth.
" See, e.g., Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 196 (2001); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
6 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 6, at 269 (noting that the judiciary must evaluate due pro-
cess in acts as diverse as "disciplining prisoners and school children, suspending drivers' li-
censes and welfare benefits, terminating employment and parental rights, curtailing public
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cess that is due. The affected party must know the grounds for a deprivation.
The affected party must have some opportunity to contest those grounds.
And a fundamentally fair process also has an equal protection component:
A party should be treated the same as others similarly situated. Thus, while
what constitutes effective notice and opportunity to contest the grounds for
deprivation will vary from situation to situation, if due process is implicated,
these procedural protections must be present to some extent and to that same
extent for all affected persons."
Under well-settled tenets of administrative law and separation of pow-
ers, these agencies enjoy significant leeway to determine the appropriate
processes by which affected persons can contest entitlements decisions, the
idea being that the government branch that initially revokes or denies bene-
fits or licenses should also be the first to adjudicate challenges to such deci-
sions. Many administrative agencies utilize "independent" adjudicators
(some more independent than others) to evaluate whether to grant govern-
ment-based licenses or entitlements. Review by a state or federal judicial
branch of government is generally possible only after at least two levels of
administrative adjudication, and, where there is a possibility of an adminis-
trative appeal, sometimes three levels of adjudication. Due to cost, fatigue,
docket management, and a host of other factors, the unsurprising practical
effect is that the vast majority of parties will have their claims finally re-
solved by the administrative state.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the United States Supreme Court set out the mod-
em balancing framework for determining what procedural processes are re-
quired," but the algebra that courts employ to evaluate whether under a
particular government scheme the affected persons are afforded sufficient
process finds its genesis in Mathews v. Eldridge." Per Mathews, the process
due in a given situation turns the balance of three variables: 1) the private
interest affected; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through existing proce-
dures and the probable value of any additional procedural safeguards; and 3)
the fiscal and administrative burdens on the government if additional proce-
dural safeguards are added.20
The holding of Mathews was that applicants for disability benefits do
not have a due process right to an evidentiary hearing before the administra-
tive agency's initial termination of their benefits. The Court deemed ade-
quate the agency's existing process of considering written submissions from
an applicant and his or her doctors, followed by an internal review of the
initial determination and the opportunity for de novo reconsideration in an
programs, prosecuting public offenders, and compelling public access to beachfront
property. . . .").
" See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 125, 691 (4th ed.
2002).
8 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 (stating that courts should balance the severity of depri-
vation against the costs to the agency).
1 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
20 See id. at 341-49.
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adversarial post-termination hearing. Distinguishing Goldberg, the Court
found that the claimant's private interest in disability benefits was not as
significant as a person's need for public assistance, and that the additional
cost and burden on the government if applicants were to be afforded pre-
deprivation hearings was substantial.2
That the degree of procedure required would turn on the relative impor-
tance of what is at stake, the risks of error, and the potential burdens on the
government, makes theoretical sense. It is just as apparent, however, that
the Mathews variables are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify objec-
tively. "[The Court's] holding that the degree and type of procedural pro-
tection that is due can be determined by weighing," Laurence Tribe
observed, "provides the Court a facile means to justify the most cursory
procedures by altering the relative weights to be accorded each of the three
factors."22 Many have criticized in particular the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion factor, and without a doubt it is an exceedingly difficult and subjective
measurement to make. Jerry Mashaw and others have posited that "softer"
variables such as credibility and discretion are critical, and therefore oral
hearings are always an essential procedural protection.23 Even where depri-
vation is inevitable, there are "'process values' that might inhere in oral
proceedings. . . ."24 There are substantial, albeit unquantifiable benefits to
an administrative system that affords applicants the "dignity of being lis-
tened to. . . ."25
Most administrative law practitioners are aware, however, that even
when parties do have the opportunity to appear before an administrative ad-
judicator, for example in unemployment benefits hearings, whether pre- or
post-deprivation, they are not guaranteed fair or equal treatment. Lucie
White, among others, has written on the disjunction between the widely held
belief that citizens should be able to meaningfully participate in government
decisions that affect their lives and "the conditions in our society in which
procedural rituals are actually played out."26 White's experiences helping
2 See id. at 347 (noting that "experience with the constitutionalizing of government pro-
cedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative burden
not insubstantial").
22 TRIBE, supra note 6 at 674; see also Farina, supra note 6 at 234 (taking issue with a test
that measures due process based on "some calculus explicitly designed to maximize aggregate
welfare"). Of course, the Mathews test sometimes leads courts to conclude that insufficient
process is being provided. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)
(holding that a public employee who can only be fired for cause is entitled to oral or written
notice of the employer's charges and evidence, and an opportunity to present his or her side of
the story before termination).
23 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 28, 48-49 (1976).24 Id. at 48.
25 Perales, supra note 8, at 892. There is also a distinct symbolic, though similarly un-
known, value in a system that, by placing a premium on process through the provision of oral
hearings, recognizes how critical benefits may be to those in need.
26 White, supra note 2, at 4.
160 [Vol. 14
2011] Narrative Preferences and Administrative Due Process 161
indigent clients obtain public assistance led her to the insight that "[s]ocial
subordination itself [by race, gender, or class] can lead disfavored groups to
deploy verbal strategies that mark their speech as deviant when measured
against dominant stylistic norms." 27
In Part IV, I demonstrate with specificity some of the ways that narra-
tive and discursive "difference" can be emphasized, exploited, and evalu-
ated in an administrative hearing, but here I want to make a final general
point about administrative law that illustrates why this kind of analysis is so
critical in the administrative setting. Contested hearings for unemployment
benefits, and in much of the administrative state, almost always turn to some
degree on credibility determinations. Administrative appellate boards and
courts are extremely reluctant to overturn a hearing adjudicator's credibility
interpretations, and warrantably S0.28 It is not uncommon for an ALJ's deci-
sions to be upheld on appeal based solely on the ALJ's determination that
one party's testimony was more believable. 29 The written transcript is an
incomplete and inevitably imperfect representation of the verbal and non-
verbal events of a trial, and, as a normative and practical matter, few would
quibble with the deference given to the credibility assessments of the adjudi-
cator who has the opportunity to observe live testimony." But because there
are no limits on how an adjudicator may weigh or determine credibility a
paradox arises:
[D]emeanor of witnesses is so significant that it cannot be disre-
garded, but the nature of this significance is so obscure that no
rules can be established for assessing such evidence. Thus, an ele-
ment at the very center of the functioning of the legal system is
outside the law's control.3'
Credibility determinations are based on observational evidence such as
"'style, paralinguistic cues, and nonverbal behavior."3 2 But which style,
what cues, and whose behavior provide the benchmark? As I discuss further
below, John Conley and William O'Barr have shown that the language of the
courtroom is gendered, exhibiting a "clear preference for a distinctively
27 Id.
28 See Christopher B. McNeil, Critical Factors of Adjudication: Language and the Adjudi-
cation Process in Executive and Judicial Branch Decisions, 23 J. NATL A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES
411, 434 (2003) ("The significance of this delegation of adjudicative authority is substantial,
in large part because the public has invested its faith in the ALJ to make key assessments of
credibility, based on all available linguistic cues, cues that are beyond the reach of appellate
courts (and thus are not likely to be rejected on appeal).").
29 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER AND STRAT-
EGY IN THE COURTROOM 42-43 (Academic Press 1982) (discussing a National Labor Relations
Board case in which the court of appeals affirmed the Board's order where it was based only
on the hearing examiner's finding that one party's testimony was more credible).
30 See generally PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 175-79 (The University of Chi-
cago Press 1999).
" O'BARR, supra note 29, at 43-44.
32 Id. at 42.
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male style."" Judges and jurors also tend to disfavor - through disbelief,
discrediting, and ultimately adverse decision-making - speaking styles as-
sociated with lower socioeconomic class.3 4 We can safely assume that this is
generally even more true in the administrative state because, unlike in most
judicial settings, the credibility determinations are not made by a jury com-
prised (at least theoretically) of one's peers but by a single judge (oftentimes
a white male) who is trained in and practices in the language of the law. The
implication is that even where applicants for government benefits are given
the opportunity to plead their case before an ALJ, they may not succeed if
they are unable to conform to narrative styles more typically associated with
the language of the court.
For these reasons, a more precise awareness of how narrative and dis-
cursive difference plays out may be critical in the administrative setting. If
we conceive of Goldberg's promise of procedural justice as "a normative
horizon rather than a technical problem,"36 how exactly can language styles
and biases reduce important procedural rights to ineffectual rites? This Arti-
cle aims to illustrate that phenomenon, allowing us to then ask the more
difficult questions: How can the administrative state attempt to accommo-
date more marginalized narrative styles in benefits hearings? Is the concept
of a "meaningful hearing" malleable enough to require ALJs to incorporate
language-related insights?
II. WHAT IS "NARRATIVE STYLE"?
Narratives are usually thought of as stories about something that has
happened. In the context of adversarial proceedings or contested hearings,
some advocates and scholars distinguish between narrative-based testimony,
through which a party is permitted to tell his or her "story" of the matter at
hand with limited interruptions (quite rare), and testimony that is elicited
through and tightly controlled by a questioning attorney or judge." "Narra-
tive style" is a broader concept that refers both to the type of story told and
to the form and language that a person uses to tell the story.
Unsurprisingly, the narratives we choose to tell, and the way we tell
them, are often linked to our professional training (or lack thereof), social
status, background experiences, and cultural values. In a seminal study of
litigants in small claims court, Conley and O'Barr found that narrative styles
" JUST WORDS, supra note 12 at 63; see also MATOESIAN, RERODUCING RAPE, supra note
12, at 98-233 (discussing reproduction and influence of patriarchal structures in rape trials).
34 See infra text accompanying notes 38-51; see also Bezdek, supra note 2, at 565-75,
583-85.
" See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 2, at 453-55; Bezdek, supra note 2, at 561-62, 586-91.
16 Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on
the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
3 See, e.g., TIERSMA, supra note 30, at 155-58; Baldacci, supra note 2, at 474-80.
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fall along a continuum between rules and relationships.38 Lawyers and other
highly educated professionals, for example, tend to tell "rule-oriented" sto-
ries. Rule-oriented accounts "base claims for legal relief on violations of
specific rules, duties, and obligations. . . ."39 Rule-oriented accounts are
usually sequential or chronological, deal explicitly with cause and effect,
and emphasize evidence that is directly relevant to the claim being made.
At the other end of the spectrum, the narrative logic of a "relational
account" foregrounds social conduct and personal details rather than causal-
ity and formal organization structures. 40 For a litigant who favors a rela-
tional account, what matters are the details of interpersonal interactions, the
social network in which he or she is situated, and his or her (perceived or
real) needs and entitlements. 4 1
The particular language a party employs to tell a story is also part of
narrative style. Looking at the question of why some trial witnesses are
deemed more credible than others, Conley and O'Barr conducted studies that
indicate that speakers who speak in "powerless language" are less likely to
be believed.42 Some features of powerless language include: hedging or ex-
pressions of uncertainty ("I think," "sort of"); hesitation or placeholder ut-
terances ("um," "uh," "well"); answering with a rising question intonation;
and unnecessary or inappropriate intensifiers ("very," "surely"). 43 Speakers
who use a powerless style are likely to be poor, undereducated, and/or of
low social status. Previously, linguists had primarily associated the charac-
teristics of powerless language with women, but Conley and O'Barr's work
showed that both men and women of lower socioeconomic status tend to-
ward powerless language."
Conley and O'Barr showed that witnesses who speak assertively are
more likely to be believed,"4 and it is surely tempting to view rule-oriented
accounts as superior to relational accounts, especially in a court-room set-
ting. Leading trial-technique textbooks specifically teach rule-oriented
" See generally JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATION-
SHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) [hereinafter RULES V.
RELATIONSHIPS].
3 JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 67. As noted elsewhere in this Article, I disagree with
the term "rule-oriented account" insofar as it suggests that other narrative styles do not follow
an intrinsic set of rules or norms.
4Id. at 68.
RULES V. RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 38, at 58-59.
42 JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 64-65. The term "powerless" is interesting, because it
defines itself by what it is not. It thus recognizes subordination but may also work to reinforce
it by designating the discursive features of an identifiable group as less than, as without power.
4 See TIERSMA, supra note 30, at 173-74.
" JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 65; see also John M. Conley et al., The Power of Lan-
guage: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1376-78; see also Wil-
liam P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of
Community Organizations, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 455, 470 (1994).
" JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 65, 90.
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methodologies, 46 and, as Atkinson and others have observed, maintaining
order by enforcing conventions such as turn-taking, relevance, and so on,
may be necessary to make complex, multiparty interactions possible.47
Nevertheless, there is no objective basis to suggest that narrative styles
employing relational values or powerless language are inherently less credi-
ble. Moreover, the development, perpetuation and use of any narrative style
is contextual and complex. For instance, we know that language-use is a
powerful tool for creating and maintaining group identity, and that some
group speakers develop and renew linguistic variation and difference in or-
der to distance themselves from the "mainstream" or dominating class, not-
withstanding the inevitable stigmatization and downgrading that the
hegemonic group assigns to the sub-group's vernacular. 48 In a related study
discussed by Jerome Bruner among others that focused on how children de-
velop their "ways with words," anthropologist Shirley Brice Heath com-
pared lower-class African American children with middle-class white
children in two neighboring towns in North Carolina.49 She found that the
African American children were praised for creatively embellishing their
stories of what they had done each day, while the white children were ad-
monished by both parents and teachers to "stick to the facts." Through this
reinforcement of differing norms, each group, unsurprisingly, continually in-
ternalized and became more facile with those differing narrative styles.
Additionally, there is evidence from recent literature in psychology that
narratives about the self tend towards the stylistic features described above
as "relational," regardless of the identity or background of the speaker. Ad-
ministrative benefits hearings usually involve evaluation of a claimant's past
actions; the claimant is called upon to describe, explain and defend what he
or she did, did not do, or should have done. In this way, the claimant is
compelled to present a narrative about his or herself (as, we will see, Ms. S
was). Psychologist Jerome Bruner collected observations regarding narra-
tives about the self from the work of leading scholars, and it turns out that
such stories are, inter alia, replete with desires, intentions, and aspirations;
sensitive to obstacles and oriented toward community ("reference groups"
that set the cultural standards by which one judges oneself); moody and af-
fective; and seek and guard their coherence through highly developed
46 See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 26, 61-84, 97-108, 405-30 (6th ed.
2002).
47 See, e.g., J. Maxwell Atkinson, Understanding Formality, 33 BRITISH J. SOCIOLOGY 86,
92 (1982); Robert Dingwall, Language, Law, and Power: Ethnomethodology, Conversation
Analysis, and the Politics of Law and Society Studies, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 885, 899-900
(2000).
48 See generally Judith Rodby, A Polyphony of Voices: The Dialectics of Linguistic Diver-
sity and Unity in the Twentieth-Century United States, in ENGLISH IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXTS
183-97 (Tim William Machan & Charles T. Scott eds., 1992).
49 See generally SHIRLEY BRICE HEATH, WAYS WITH WORDS: LANGUAGE, LIFE, AND
WORK IN COMMUNITIES AND CLASSROOMS (1983).
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psychic procedures.50 Though these researchers were not writing about self-
narratives in the context of court or other adjudicatory proceedings, the work
collected by Bruner still suggests that the "natural" state of such stories may
tend to be less rule-based and more relational.
In short, then, narrative style is both what we deem to be important to
include in a story and how we go about presenting that story. A value-and-
experience-driven endeavor, storytelling in the legal context is thus influ-
enced by a multitude of interactive factors, as are one's reactions to the nar-
rative styles of others. The problem that arises is that adjudicators tend to be
much more comfortable with rule-based narrative styles, sometimes to a de-
gree that threatens fundamental rights of those who cannot or do not
conform.
III. BACKGROUND FOR THIS UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
HEARING CASE STUDY
In this Part, I provide background that will aid the reader with the ana-
lytic sections that follow. First, I outline New York State's unemployment
insurance benefits scheme, which as a joint program with the federal govern-
ment is similar to that of most states. I then give a non-technical overview
of the dispute between the parties that will place the hearing, and the argu-
ments made therein, in context.
A. New York State's Unemployment Insurance Benefits Scheme
New York, like all states, participates in a joint program with the fed-
eral government that provides temporary, compensatory benefits to employ-
ees who become unemployed through no fault of their own. Federal law sets
out the general requirements but allows each state to determine its own eligi-
bility requirements." An applicant generally is eligible for benefits if he or
she earned adequate past wages, is not at fault in losing his or her job, is still
unemployed, and is ready, willing, and able to work.52
Procedurally, in New York, the employee can apply for benefits over
the telephone or on the internet. Usually within a few weeks, the applicant
receives a notice stating the amount of monetary benefits he or she will
receive if found eligible. The State Department of Labor ("DOL") then no-
tifies the applicant's former employer of the claim, providing the employer
with the opportunity to object. Once the DOL concludes its investigation,
applicants who are determined to be ineligible are issued a written statement
providing the grounds for the denial. The applicant may request a hearing
50 JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 70-71 (2002).
' See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C § 3301-11. (2006); Federal Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-04, 1101-05 (2006).
52 See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 500-643 (McKinney 2010); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGs. tit. 12, §§ 460.1-490.7 (2010).
Harvard Latino Law Review
within thirty days," which is typically scheduled to occur two to five weeks
after the request. If the ALJ sustains the initial denial, the applicant may
appeal to the DOL Appeal Board. Judicial review of the Appeal Board's
decision is then possible in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion (Third Department).
In New York City, the administrative hearings at which DOL's initial
determinations regarding unemployment benefits claims are contested are
held in small rooms. The parties sit a few feet across from each other at a
table, while the ALJ presides at an elevated desk at the head of the table.
The table accommodates up to five people, not including the ALJ. Parties
may be represented by counsel and are given an opportunity to present oral
testimony and to submit relevant written evidence. Witnesses, if their prof-
fered testimony is deemed relevant by the ALJ, may be called. Each party
(or the party's counsel, if represented) has the opportunity to cross-examine
the adversary's witnesses and to redirect testimony of the parties' own wit-
nesses. The rules of evidence are not mandated, but a party's objections
based on those rules, for example, objections to the introduction of hearsay,
are frequently sustained. There is no formal discovery process, but parties
may ask the ALJ to issue subpoenas for witnesses and documents to be pro-
duced at the hearing. Brief closing arguments are also permitted. Thus, Un-
employment Insurance hearings (UI hearings) share some structural
elements with civil trials.
But UI hearings also differ from the usual practice in civil trials in
important ways. The ALJ can, and invariably does, directly question either
or both parties at some length. There are no limits on the form or method of
the ALJ's questions; he may cross-examine or lead the witness. And unlike
civil court, the UI hearing begins with the employer's account of the reasons
for discharge and the employer's evidence; the employee's version is not told
until late in the proceeding. As we shall see presently, this is a structural
element that, at least in cases involving significant differences in power and
narrative style between the applicant and the employer, can work to rein-
force and exacerbate those differences in critical ways.
B. Ms. S's Dispute with Her Employer
Ms. 54 was a New York civil service employee for twenty-three years.
More than the last ten of those years were at the Department of Human
Resources Administration ("HRA"), with an intervening year on medical
leave after a welfare applicant attacked her with a knife while she was at
work. In Ms. S's account, for the first several years in HRA there were no
problems. Eventually, however, the situation between Ms. S and her direct
supervisor began to deteriorate. A major source of the problem seems to
have been the escalation of symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress
* N.Y. LAB. LAW § 620(1)(a) (McKinney 2002).
* As noted above, the abbreviation "Ms. S" is used to protect the privacy of the applicant.
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disorder (PTSD) following the knife attack. Because Ms. S was, she claims,
increasingly unable to tolerate crowded subway trains, she was regularly late
to work, and she was frequently docked pay or threatened with termination
because of her inability to arrive on time.
Eventually, Ms. S, with the assistance of her doctor, began petitioning
HRA for an adjustment of her working hours, to begin later in the day when
trains would not be crowded, but these efforts were to little avail. The dis-
pute came to a head in August of 2003, and finally Ms. S, her union repre-
sentative, and HRA signed a probation agreement in which Ms. S agreed not
to be late for a period of one year, and HRA agreed to allow her to arrive at
work between 9:30 and 10:30 in the morning. Ms. S was terminated less
than four months later, allegedly for violating the probation agreement.
Ms. S then applied for unemployment insurance benefits. DOL began
its investigation, and Ms. S's former employer informed DOL that Ms. S had
been fired because she had attempted to avoid being caught late by not swip-
ing her time card upon her arrival at work. Based on this information,
DOL's initial decision was to deny unemployment benefits. Ms. S elected to
contest the initial decision in a UI hearing.
C. Ms. S's Narrative Style
When I was a student-lawyer in an Employment Law Clinic, Ms. S was
one of my first clients. When another student and I first interviewed Ms. S,
we attempted to let her tell her story without limiting her only to the details
we thought might be relevant to her UI hearing.55 We encouraged her to
express all of her concerns and desires with respect to her employment. Us-
ing this process, we learned that Ms. S strongly felt she had been mistreated
for the last five years by her direct supervisor. We learned that in spite of
those feelings, Ms. S's primary wish was to have her job back. We also
learned that Ms. S's linguistic style tended heavily towards what has been
called a "relational account," beset with "powerless language." 56
The premise underlying Ms. S's version of her work history was that
she is a good person who met her social obligations and therefore should
have been treated more fairly. She catalogued her various ailments of the
last decade. She described the uncomfortable relationship that she had de-
veloped with her direct supervisor at HRA. She recounted numerous exam-
ples of occasions in which she had done something nice for colleagues at
work, or had performed her job well, or had tried to make amends with her
supervisor. From a karmic perspective, Ms. S made a compelling case that
the denial of six months of unemployment insurance following twenty-three
years working for the city seemed unfair. Moreover, Ms. S was a good
storyteller, with a flair for conveying emotion, humor and drama. But,
somewhat paradoxically, lawyers labor to disguise or transform their stories
5 See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 16-23 (1991).
56 See supra Part II. See generally JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 64-65, 68.
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into unstorylike, self-evident accounts," and even as second-year law stu-
dents we knew then that Ms. S's tendencies to dwell on her personal status
and her relationships with others, to wander from what we deemed to be
"the point," and to background conventions such as chronology, were not
going to help when it came time to make her case in the UI hearing. As her
advocates, we were also concerned about Ms. S's imprecision with regard to
dates and timelines, her hedging language, and her reluctance to make eye
contact; her use of what has been called "powerless language."
We have seen that race, culture, gender, education, and social status can
influence the types of stories people tell and the way they tell them."8 Was
Ms. S's narrative style influenced by the fact that she is a Latina woman?
Was her status as a low-level worker in a hierarchical city agency a factor?
Perhaps her storytelling was related to the violent knife attack by Ms. S's
welfare client years earlier. One can only speculate, but whatever the rea-
sons behind Ms. S's particular use of language, the clinic was concerned that
it would negatively affect her unemployment insurance hearing. Judges, like
jurors, tend to believe witnesses who speak assertively.59
In preparing for Ms. S's hearing, we took what we had noticed about
her linguistic traits into account. We did what advocates do, constructing
lines of questioning for direct-examination that we hoped would focus her
answers towards our case theory, practicing potential cross-examinations,
advising her to listen carefully to the question and to answer only what was
specifically asked, and explaining which information we thought the ALJ
would be most interested in. 60 In short, we tried to convert Ms. S's story into
what some refer to as a "rule-oriented" account.61 Nevertheless, Ms. S's
intuitive sense of persuasion was powerfully aligned with the logic of the
relational account,62 and, we would discover, the ALJ adjudicating Ms. S's
case had little patience for her narrative style.
1 BRUNER, supra note 50, at 48.
5 See supra Part II..
' JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 65, 90.
' Cf Janet Cotterill, 'Just One More Time. . .': Aspects of Intertextuality in the Trials of
O.J. Simpson, in LANGUAGE IN THE LEGAL PROCESs 148 (noting that "the constraints of court-
room interaction are such that the narrative account which is elicited in court may bear only a
passing resemblance to the base version recorded in any foundational [] interview or
statement.").
61 See supra Part H. My criticism of the label "rule-oriented account" is that it implies
that narrative styles that preference different values, for example the role of relationships or
the maintenance of group membership, are not following a system of rules. The process of
attempting to convert a client's natural narrative style to the "language of the law" is one that
many practitioners, including myself, have found to be jarring and even violent. See, e.g.,
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2125.
62 See TIERSMA, supra note 30, at 175.
168 [Vol. 14
2011] Narrative Preferences and Administrative Due Process
IV. Ms. S's UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE HEARING
A. Ms. S's UI Hearing: A Non-Technical Overview
Recall that when Ms. S applied for unemployment benefits after being
fired, HRA, her former employer, alleged that she intentionally did not
swipe in her time card upon arriving at work to avoid being caught late. The
New York DOL preliminarily denied unemployment benefits based on this
allegation, and Ms. S elected to contest that denial at a hearing before an
ALJ.
The witness who testified at the hearing on behalf of Ms. S's former
employer was "Mr. L,"63 incidentally the same attorney who had drafted the
probation agreement that Ms. S allegedly violated, resulting in her termina-
tion. Another city attorney, Mr. Williams, was present to represent the em-
ployer in the hearing. Thus, Ms. S was the only person in the room not
trained (or in the process of being trained) in the law.
The Employment Law Clinic had subpoenaed the office manager from
HRA, whose testimony we believed would corroborate Ms. S's claim that
her time card was defective during the period in question, and thus that her
card swipes did not register. We had also subpoenaed records from the time
card unit at HRA on this issue, which supported our theory that her card had
in fact been determined to be defective in the relevant time period and she
had been issued a new card. During the hearing, however, the employer
unexpectedly changed the asserted grounds for Ms. S's termination. Aban-
doning its prior allegation that Ms. S failed to swipe her card at all, the
employer now alleged that Ms. S had swiped her card, but that she had been
several minutes late on several days. The ALJ denied the clinic's request for
an adjournment to prepare in light of these new allegations, and ultimately
ruled against Ms. S based on the employer's oral testimony. In the next
section, I connect the AL's management of the hearing and evidentiary rul-
ings with his apparent biases regarding the parties' contrasting narrative
styles.
B. Ms. S's UI Hearing in Detail
The ALJ began by eliciting from the employer's attorney, Mr. Williams,
information about Ms. S's salary, the length of her employment, and the
reason for her discharge:
Excerpt Ones:
1. ALJ: How long did the claimant work for the employer?
63 The pseudonym "Mr. L" will be used to protect the privacy of the employer's witness.
6 Transcript of Ms. S's Ut Hearing (on file with author). A portion of the hearing was
marked by the transcriber as inaudible. I have confined my analysis to those passages that
have been transcribed.
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Ah, the claimant has worked for the City since September
2nd, 1980.
Okay. And her, actual, last day of work?
Ah, the last day of employment, December 10th, 2003.
Okay. Now, was this a fulltime position?
That's correct.
Approximate salary?
Salary we have - - Last salary reported $36,519 annually.
Okay. And was the claimant a member of a union?
That's correct.
Okay. And how did the claimant's job end? Did she quit?
Was she discharged?
The claimant was, actually, terminated after violation of a
stipulation agreement.
Following this exchange, the ALJ permitted Mr. Williams to conduct a
direct examination of the employer's witness, Mr. L, to more closely fill in
the details, and then the AU had some follow-up questions for Mr. L. Thus,
as is typical in a Ul hearing, the ALJ's initial exposure to the facts of the
case was completely from the employer's perspective.
As can be seen in Excerpt One, the AL's questioning of the employer
and his attorney was executed almost entirely with non-leading questions, in
stark contrast to the questioning style the ALJ was subsequently to employ
with Ms. S. And as might be expected from two attorneys, the account
presented by Mr. Williams and Mr. L was squarely rule-oriented. HRA's
narrative, as told by Mr. L and Mr. Williams, was arranged sequentially,
dealt explicitly with cause and effect, and identified those responsible for
events germane to the narrative. In other words, HRA's presentation of its
case, like other rule-oriented accounts, conformed to the usual logic of the
law by emphasizing relevant evidence and excluding irrelevant evidence.
The following excerpt is illustrative:
Excerpt Two65:
1. ALJ: If you can just briefly tell me what led up to the claimant
being terminated, maybe in sort of chronological -
2. Mr. L: Okay. There were disciplinary charges, lateness charges, that
were filed against Ms. S. She opted to go to Section 75 to
fight this case or try to renegotiate the case. During settlement,
we agreed to alter her flex-time to a 10:30. The latest she
could come in was 10:30. The time was 10:30 to 10:30.
3. AL: Um hum.
4. Mr. L: And if she violates this agreement, coming late after 10:30,
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5. ALJ: Let me just understand. What happened was that claimant had
been late for work, from what you testified, on numerous
occasions?
6. Mr. L: Correct.
7. ALJ: Okay. She was brought up on charges because of that?
8. Mr. L: Correct.
The AU begins this line of questioning with an explicit request that the
testimony be chronological, signaling a preference for a rule-oriented narra-
tive, and Mr. L was equipped to oblige. In a very short amount of time, the
employer has now established (subject to later revision, perhaps) that Ms. S
has had a problem with lateness, that she was brought up on charges due to
this lateness, that HRA proposed a reasonable compromise, and that Ms. S
was even represented by her union when she agreed to the compromise.
This is a persuasive narrative, and there are no extraneous details. 66
In the following passage, the employer continues his account, explain-
ing, on the ALJ's prompting, why Ms. S was fired, and it is here that the new
allegations are raised for the first time:
Excerpt Three67 :
1. AL: Let me ask you this, Mr. L. Did you make the decision to
terminate the claimant?
2. Mr. L: Ah, myself in conjunction with my superiors.
4. AL: Okay. In conjunction with your superiors, what caused you, in
conjunction with your superiors, to terminate the claimant
after she had signed, entered into the stipulation?
5. Mr. L: She violated the stipulation on six occasions.
6. AL: On six occasions. And, ah, what was the last occasion that she
violated the stipulation?
7. Mr. L: This occasion was December 1st, 2003.
8. AL: On December 1st. Now, these six occasions, do you have
those specific dates? Can you tell me the six occasions?
9. Mr. L: Yes. Beginning on August 27th, 2003, Ms. S was late past
10:30, two minutes. Then on September 3rd, 2003, it was one
minute late. And then we proceed on to November 14, 2003,
two minutes late. November 21st, 2003, one minute late.
November 24th, 2003, two minutes late. And December 1st,
66 For example, Mr. L did not bring up the antagonistic relationship that he and Ms. S had
over the past few years. According to Ms. S, one particular instance of this animosity occurred
on the day of the settlement agreement, when Mr. L acknowledged that he did not like Ms. S.
Naturally, there are many reasons Mr. L would not volunteer such information, including that
it might demonstrate some sort of bias against Ms. S and it does not fit the employer's narra-
tive that Ms. S should not receive benefits because she was terminated for being late in viola-
tion of a stipulated agreement. But this sort of information demonstrates the distinction
between rule-oriented and relational accounts - it is relevant to the latter but not the former.
Ms. S thought it very important that the AU know about her poor relationships with Mr. L and
with her direct supervisor.
67 Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
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2003, four minutes late. Based upon those, those violations, I
brought the case up to my superiors and discussed it. Deter-
mined she had violated the stipulation.
10. AL: At this point, I don't have any further questions of Mr. L.
In turns 5 and 9, the employer presents new grounds for the termina-
tion, abandoning the failure-to-swipe allegations of which Ms. S had been
given prior notice and on which the DOL had based its initial denial of
benefits. Stylistically, Mr. L's account in this passage is quite effective. It is
chronological and detailed. And, in the face of the potential that the city will
come off as unreasonable or callous, the employer's witness does a nice job
of putting the basis for the termination in the best possible light. Though by
the employer's own account Ms. S was cumulatively twelve minutes late
over a period of four months, Mr. L focuses the AU on the number of times
Ms. S violated the stipulation before the decision to terminate was made.68
In this way, HRA seems almost lenient and reasonable, because it did not
seek to terminate Ms. S until she allegedly had violated the probation agree-
ment six times.6 9 This excerpted passage also suggests that the AU found
the employer's account highly credible. Consider again: these allegations
were made for the first time at this hearing, and they contrasted distinctly
with DOL's prior allegations. Mr. L, it had been established, did not work in
the unit where payroll hours were maintained. Nor was any documentation
of these new allegations offered. And yet, the AU had no further questions
for Mr. L. Without knowing more, at this stage of the analysis we are
obliged to give the ALJ the benefit of the doubt and assume that he may
simply have wished to reserve judgment until hearing more testimony. After
all, it is not necessarily the ALJ's role to probe the weaknesses of the em-
ployer's case, at least where the claimant is represented by counsel.
Persisting with our own case theory based on the original allegations,
we first established that HRA had never investigated the possibility of a
defective card before terminating Ms. S (the probation stipulation, we had
intended to argue, required the employer to "substantiate" the basis for a
violation of the agreement). When my clinic partner Ms. Saeed began to
cross-examine Mr. L on HRA's decision to change the grounds for why Ms.
S was terminated, however, the following exchange took place:
6 Of further possible interest on this subject, but certainly speculative, is Mr. L's gram-
matical shifting of responsibility for the decision to terminate Ms. S. By adding the preposi-
tional clause "in conjunction with my supervisors," a formulation that the AU picks up and
appends (twice) to his follow-up question in turn 3, Mr. L is able to depersonalize the decision
to terminate, implying that it was, at least as possibly, made by a group. This hedging contin-
ues, culminating in turn 8 with a missing subject that would indicate who actually made the
penultimate critical "determin[ation]" that led to Ms. S's termination. That the regular verb
form does not change in English language depending on who is doing the action lends itself to
interesting linguistic ambiguity and strategy.
69 Nor do I wish to suggest that chronic lateness is not problematic for any employer, and
Ms. S did sign a probation agreement.
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You told the Department of Labor just the one day? Is that
correct?
Objection.
Maybe I'll clarify the question in this way. According to
the initial notice of determination, it indicates that claimant
- The Department of Labor found that claimant was dis-
charged after she was previously warned when, on Decem-
ber 3rd, 2003, she failed to swipe in or out again. Do you
recall talking to the Department of Labor regarding how the
claimant's job ended?
No, I did not speak to the Department of Labor.
Okay.
The determination was -
Okay. You've explained it. Your question has been
answered, Ms. Saeed. Next question.
Knowing the factual allegations one will have to counter is a fundamen-
tal component of administrative due process." For this reason (and others),
the basis for the discrepancy between the grounds forming the rationale for
DOL's initial denial of benefits and the employer's new allegations was a
relevant area of evidence to explore. But in this excerpt, the AU does a
great deal to minimize any negative impact on the employer's account thus
far. First, in turn 3, he reframes the clinic's questioning from whether there
was a discrepancy in allegations, to whether Mr. L personally spoke to the
DOL on behalf of the employer. The reformulation is not the relevant ques-
tion; Mr. L was testifying as a representative of the employer so the proper
question concerns what the employer conveyed previously, and why the alle-
gations are different now. Then, when at the end of the exchange it appeared
that Mr. L was about to offer some further explanation for the discrepancy,
the ALJ cut him off, indicated his answer was satisfactory, and instructed
Ms. Saeed to move on to the next question (turn 7).
When the clinic concluded its brief (and largely ineffectual) cross-ex-
amination of Mr. L, the hearing turned, finally, to Ms. S's testimony. In the
following excerpts, then, we can contrast the ALJ's interactions with Ms. S,
which illustrate his reactions to her very different narrative style. The ALJ
began this portion of the hearing with leading questions to corroborate the
less controversial details of the employer's story:
Excerpt Five 72:
1. AL: In terms of the particulars, you worked for the New York City
Human Resources Administration as a principal administrative
associate from about September of 1980, and your last day
7o Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
' See supra Part I.
72 Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
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worked was December 20, 2003, and you were a fulltime
employee, and you made about $36,000 a year, is that correct?
2. Ms. S: Yes.
3. ALJ: Okay. And you were a member of the union? Is that correct?
4. Ms. S: Yes.
5. ALJ: Okay. And was this the last employer that you worked for
before you applied for Unemployment benefits?
6. Ms. S: Yes, it is.
In principle there is nothing objectionable about establishing relevant,
non-controversial details through the use of leading questions. One reasona-
ble explanation for doing so is efficiency: perhaps the ALJ knew that Ms. S
would have a story to tell and wanted to save time by getting the uncon-
troversial "particulars" out of the way quickly. On the other hand, begin-
ning with leading questions for the employee, after having used open-ended
questions to learn the information from the employer, affects the power dy-
namic at play, especially where the employer is an institutional, repeat
player (here, an agency of the City of New York).
Leading questions are highly coercive because the formulation of the
question suggests the answer desired. A witness answering leading ques-
tions is telling the examiner's story, not her own." For that reason, in both
civil and criminal trials, leading questions are only permitted on cross-exam-
ination. In Ms. S's administrative hearing, the ALJ allowed the employer to
build the narrative framework by answering open-ended questions, and then
challenged Ms. S to contradict what he had learned. The sub-textual mes-
sage may thus have been: "I have gotten the truth from the employer; your
job is to corroborate that account."
After the non-controversial details were corroborated, the ALJ retained
control of the hearing and turned his questioning to the reasons for
discharge:
Excerpt Six7 4:
1. ALJ: Can you just tell me, in your words, what reason were you
given for being discharged?
2. Ms. S: I was told - Well, the letter told me that I was in violation of
the stipulation that I had signed August 19th.
3. ALJ: Let me ask you this. Ah, what ah - - you mentioned you were a
member of a union. As a result of your termination, are there
any kind of grievances pending or anything like that?
4. Ms. S: I was never informed of my right to grieve or to have any-
5. ALJ: Um hum.
" See, e.g., LANGUAGE IN THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 149; Matoesian pro-
vides a fascinating and meticulously detailed analysis of how the defense attorney in the rape
trial of William Kennedy Smith used leading questions to tightly control and dominate a prose-
cution witness. See MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY, supra note 13, at 69-
79.
74 Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
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6. Ms. S: I later learned that I could have an appeal, but it was not given
to me in my letter of termination. Nor was I made aware of my
- the process that I could have taken.
7. ALJ: Ah, now, you indicated that you were discharged because of a
violation of the agreement you signed on August 19th, 2003.
First the - Can you tell me what led up - What led you to
sign the stipulation on August 19? What caused that?
8. Ms. S: Oh, well, I -
9. AL: Please tell me in brief.
10. Ms. S: I received an injury from being on the job, by being assaulted
by a client. And since then I have post-traumatic stress syn-
drome, and I have an active compensation case in which the
department pays for my medication and my doctor's treatment.
And I asked for a reasonable accommodation, and I was
denied. Denied for about five years. Many times. Finally, I
was awaiting a trial, and I was presented with this stipulation.
Though the ALJ begins by asking Ms. S to explain the reasons she was
given for her discharge "in her words," it quickly becomes clear that he has
little patience for her sense of narrative and relevance. When Ms. S provides
more than a simple "no" to the ALJ's query in turn 4 whether there were any
grievances pending, the ALJ utters "Urn hum" (turn 5), which though may
have been intended simply to signal that he was listening, functioned as an
interruption because of the timing. In turns 4 and 6, Ms. S tries to express
what she feels was unfair process at the time of termination, but the ALJ
simply ignores this appeal to moral probity, which is irrelevant to the pre-
vailing framework of the matter thus far, and steers the questioning back to
the stipulation agreement (turn 7). Conley and O'Barr's research study of
judges led them to conclude that this is a common phenomenon:
Judges who see themselves as rule-bound often work to frame liti-
gants' accounts within categories to which rules will apply. Such
judges typically respond with interest and affirmation when liti-
gants talk about contracts, property lines, or documents, but they
react passively or negatively when litigants seek to introduce
lengthy personal histories into their accounts. Rule-bound judges
frequently told us that litigants who sought to mix the personal and
the legal were unfocused, unintelligent, or even crazy."
More subtly, the ALJ inaccurately restates Ms. S's testimony that the
dismissal letter "told me that I was in violation of the stipulation" (turn 2) as
"you indicated that you were discharged because of a violation of the agree-
ment" (turn 7). Though it retains several possible readings, the ALJ's refor-
mulation of the testimony turns a statement in which the focus is on what
7 JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 90.
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she was told (and how she was told it)76 to a statement focused on cause and
effect. This is accomplished by way of the insertion of an adverbial "be-
cause" clause. Then, evidently weary of Ms. S's relational discursive style,
in turn 9 the ALJ interrupts her, just as she is beginning to speak, to demand
brevity. In the face of the ALJ's interruption, however, Ms. S's response
here is fairly coherent and relevant. She plausibly explains why she had
problems with lateness (her medically diagnosed PTSD) and suggests that
the stipulation was the first "reasonable accommodation" that HRA had of-
fered, which is why she signed it (turn 10).1
There followed a few tangential questions to attempt to clarify what
Ms. S had meant by "trial" in turn 10, and then the ALJ asked her again:
Excerpt Seven"8 :
1. ALJ: Well, why did you sign the stipulation?
2. Ms. S: I was under duress, and I didn't understand. I really didn't
understand what was entailed there, and the union representa-
tive did not represent me very well. And I, in fact, was waiting
to see a Judge that day. I was under the impression that I was
going to see a Judge, and the Judge would over - - would see
this stipulation and look at it.
Though Ms. S undoubtedly felt she had been under "duress," whether
that was the case was a digression that would ultimately be unpersuasive to
the ALJ. But after the ALJ had challenged the details of her first response
and then repeated the same "why did you sign the stipulation" question,
only slightly rephrased, and irrespective of the fact that she had just given
him an answer, Ms. S fell back on her intuitive internal logic and attempted
a more relational-oriented explanation. Thus, in this second response (ex-
cerpt seven, turn 2), Ms. S tries to convey the pressure she was under at the
settlement, the fact that no one present seemed to be on her side, and the
necessity for a judge to make sure the agreement was fair. The technique of
repeating or rephrasing a question is fairly common in cross-examinations
because it is a useful way to convey skepticism and may lead the witness to
contradict herself. The message is: "I didn't buy your first answer so I'm
going to ask you one more time." In this instance, the technique was being
utilized by the participant whose institutional role is supposed to be impar-
tial, the ALJ.
6 There is an interesting self-repair event in turn 2, in which Ms. S drops "I was told" in
exchange for "the letter told me." By putting agency on a letter rather than person (albeit, an
implied person, as the former abandoned construction lacks a subject), the effect is to empha-
size that impersonal way that she was fired, which arguably violates a norm inherent in the
kind of narrative account that puts a primacy on relations.
n Incidentally (and perhaps by way of ego-preservation), the clinic did not suggest or
coach Ms. S to employ the legal terminology in this passage (e.g., "post-traumatic stress syn-
drome" and "reasonable accommodation").
" Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
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ALJs should not be faulted for probing for the truth and it may well be
that the judge felt Ms. S's first answer was not responsive or comprehensi-
ble. Perhaps he felt she had something more persuasive to say about why
she would sign such a severe probation agreement; or perhaps he just wanted
her to admit that she thought it was in her best interest to sign it and thereby
assumed the risk of non-compliance. For our purposes, the principle rele-
vance of the exchange in excerpt seven is how the dominating effect of this
sort of cross-examination technique by an ALJ leads Ms. S to fall back on
her preferred narrative logic of relational accounts, and in this way, works to
reinforce and reproduce social order. This phenomenon is even more palpa-
ble in the next excerpt:
Excerpt Eight 9 :
1. ALJ: I'm looking at this stipulation. I'm seeing your signature. You
signed it. I'm also seeing underneath "Counsel for Respon-
dent" which, evidently, is you, Ms. S. Gwen Richardson - Is
that your attorney?
2. Ms. S: No, she's just a union representative.
3. ALJ: Now, you said you were under duress. What kind of duress
were you under?
4. Ms. S: I was waiting for a trial. I'm on medication, and I - I was
nervous, because I was waiting to see a Judge.
5. ALJ: I still don't understand. If you didn't want to sign this, a, stipu-
lation, I don't understand why being nervous somehow made
you sign the stipulation.
6. Ms. S: I - I - I - was confused, and I was - I didn't know that was
part of the trial. At first, I didn't know that was part of the trial.
I thought the Judge was going to come in. If you're waiting for
a Judge, - The Judge never came. I went there for a trial, and
both my union representative, and the counselor for the
Department, were, you know, very . . . You know, like, I was
supposed to sign, and I was confused, and I didn't understand
it, and it was not, exactly, explained to me.
7. ALJ: All right. Now after you signed this stipulation, and, ah, -
Now the employers indicated you were late to work on six
occasions.
In turn 5 of this passage, the AU employs a different cross-examina-
tion tool for discrediting a witness's response. Unsatisfied with Ms. S's re-
sponse in turn 4, the judge directly states his skepticism and lets it hang in
the air. Even more cutting than merely repeating a question, this technique
puts the witness in a very defensive position (and in fact would probably be
objectionable in a court where rules of evidence strictly apply). Forced to
attempt to explain herself a third time, Ms. S's narrative now thoroughly
breaks down, largely losing any rule-based orientation. Perhaps to over-
79 Id.
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come the ALJ's obvious lack of sympathy, Ms. S struggles to elaborate on
her feelings at the time of the probation agreement. Her response in turn 6
shows her to have been operating under the assumption that if only the AU
could know more about her poor relationships with the HRA and her union
representative, and the hurried and perhaps unclear nature of the settlement,
he would agree that the stipulation was unfair. In particular, Ms. S again
tries to emphasize how upset she was that the judge never appeared to over-
see the settlement, whose impartial presence she seems to be suggesting was
necessary for a fair agreement to be reached. When Ms. S's attempt at a
rule-oriented account seemed to have failed so miserably, she was compelled
to fall back on relation-based explanations, putting primacy on her interac-
tions with her employer, the union representative, and the absent judge.
When Ms. S concluded this final attempt at an explanation in turn 6, the
ALJ's utterance ("All right") is unresponsive except as a cursory acknowl-
edgement that she had said something; a placeholder until he shifts the testi-
mony to the evidentiary heart of the matter: the days the employer was now
alleging that she was late. The following passage immediately follows Ex-
cerpt Eight:
Excerpt Nine":
1. ALJ: [T]he employers indicated you were late to work on August
27, 2003. Now, were you late to work on that day? Do you
remember?
2. Ms. S: I don't recall, no.
3. ALJ: Okay. For September 3rd, do you recall whether or not you
were late for work on that day? September 3rd?
4. Ms. S: No, I don't.
5. AL: All right. On November 14th, 2003, do you recall if you were
late for work on that date?
6. Ms. S: No.
7. ALJ: For November 21st, 2003, do you recall if you were [late]?
8. Ms. S: [Oh,-]
9. ALJ: Let me finish. On that date? Yes or no? You don't recall?
10. Ms. S: No, I don't recall.
11. ALJ: Now, for November 24th, 2003, do you recall if you were late
for work on that date?
12. Ms. S: I recall having a problem with the card, with my time card, and
on several occasions, there were problems with the clock also.
Around that date, I started looking at the fact that we had
problems with the time cards. With the I.D. cards.
13. AL: Okay. Let me understand something. The first of the - Step by
step.
14. Ms. S: Um hum.
8 Id.
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15. ALJ: For November 24th, do you recall whether or not you were late
for work on that day?
16. Ms. S: No, I don't.
17. AL: Okay. On December 1st, 2003, do you recall whether or not
you were late for work on December 1st?
18. Ms. S: No I don't recall. I'm pretty sure that I wasn't late. This is the
first time that I've heard of that.
19. ALJ: Okay. You've indicated - Actually, I'm not quite sure that I
understand your answer to my last question. You've answered
me to - you've said two things: "No, I don't recall." But you
also say, "I was pretty sure that I wasn't late."
20. Ms. S: I was pretty sure that I wasn't late all along. But December 1st
was the date that I was called here, and we were addressing.
That's why I remember. . . . The Department of Labor was
informed that I did not swipe in for December 1st. That was
one of the dates.
21. ALJ: I'm not asking you whether you've not been swiped in. At this
point, I'm going to find out do you recall whether or not you
were late for work on December 1st. That's all I'm asking you.
22. Ms. S: Do I recall? Yes. I recall that I was not late for work.
23. ALJ: [You do?]'
24. Ms. S: Yes, I do recall.
25. ALJ: Now, I'm- How would you indicate that - You recall that you
were not late for work. How did you know that? That you were
not late for work on that date?
26. Ms. S: Because I was well aware that I had a problem with my I.D.
card by December 1st.
The conventions of courtroom discourse have been shown to facilitate
lawyers' linguistic power over the witnesses they question." The conven-
tions of Unemployment Insurance Benefits hearings, and perhaps many
other contested hearings in the administrative state, allow for even greater
domination over witnesses, not just because the rules of evidence are relaxed
and the prospects for meaningful appellate or judicial review dim, but also
because the ALJ is largely free to prosecute as well as referee the proceed-
ings. As we have seen, in Ms. S's hearing the principal actor exercising
considerable linguistic power over her was the AL. In the passage just
excerpted, the AL's repetitive questioning technique repeatedly hammers
Ms. S's inability to recollect timeliness for each individual day, and has the
effect of making the sum seem much greater than its parts. Though Ms. S
" The transcriber could not hear what the ALJ said on this turn, but the clinic's recollec-
tion was that he said, "You do?" This, or some equivalent, seems borne out by Ms. S' re-
sponse in her next turn.
82 MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY, supra note 13, at 54; JUST WORDS,
supra note 12, at 21; LANGUAGE IN THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 149.
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was only accused of being a few minutes late on each of the days 3 (a fact
that the ALJ never acknowledged during the hearing or in his final decision),
the repetition gathers emotional force, creating the powerful cumulative im-
pression that Ms. S is a serious repeat offender. Repetitive question tech-
nique is also a well-recognized method of breaking a witness down. Finally,
it has the consequence of making Ms. S seem unreliable and untrustworthy,
because she is forced to admit she does not recall so many times in a row.
Note also how the ALJ reins in Ms. S whenever she strays from the
precise answer he is seeking. In turn 12, she is able to offer an explanation
why she was likely not late on November 21 (i.e., due to the defective card),
but the ALJ forces her back to the "step by step" (turn 13) technique he
prefers: the dialogue that continually reiterates her lateness and her failure
to recollect.8 4 By repeating his tightly controlled question forms, which de-
mand that she answer only yes or no, Ms. S is quickly forced to admit that
she does not recall whether she might have been minutes late on a particular
day five months earlier.
There is linguistic evidence that the ALJ is using this questioning tech-
nique (at least subconsciously) largely for its effect on the witness rather
than for evidence-gathering, and with the underlying objective to support his
imminent categorization of Ms. S as not entitled to unemployment benefits.
Observe again what transpires in the above excerpt when Ms. S offers an
answer the ALJ is not expecting, or, the data suggests, preferring (turns 18-
26). Adjacency pairs are a significant feature of many verbal exchanges. In
most adjacency pairs, the speaker of the first part (here, a question) is antici-
pating, or in fact preferring, a particular second part (an answer).85 The ALJ
hammers through each step of his repetitive questioning list, in turn 9 even
explicitly broadcasting the answer he is looking for ("you don't recall?").
But when Ms. S states that she was not late on December 1st, the ALJ is
surprised; this is not the expected response. He again utilizes the reign-in
technique of rejecting her explanation that her time card was defective, and
repeating the yes / no "do you recall" question (turn 21), but this time Ms. S
is able to maintain her answer. The ALJ demonstrates his incredulity by
repeating the question a third time (turn 23), and through a barrage of ques-
tions the ALJ expressed his disbelief that a person could accurately recall
such a thing (turn 25).
8 The total number of minutes she was allegedly late over a period of four months was
twelve minutes, and six of those minutes were during the period when her time card was
apparently defective.
" See LANGUAGE IN THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 12, at 149 ("[R]esearchers on
courtroom language [ ] have written about the extent to which the question-and-answer model
of testimony elicitation within the adversarial system, which prioritises the use of closed and
controlling question forms, has the effect of constraining the witness' freedom to present narra-
tive testimony, thereby preventing them from 'telling their own story."') (citations omitted);
see also MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY, supra note 13, at 54; TIERSMA,
supra note 30, at 154 ("We often say that a witness gives testimony. In reality, the legal system
takes it.")
" JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 83; see also MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF
IDENTITY, supra note 13, at 92-93.
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Demonstrating disbelief through questions is a kind of evaluative com-
ment, and thus another source of domination available to lawyers (and adju-
dicators). The ALJ demands that Ms. S remember, without notice, whether
she had been few minutes late on various particular dates in the months
preceding her termination. When she inevitably cannot, he (later) trans-
forms her inability to do so into admissions that she was in fact late.86 But
the repetitive pattern is broken when she surprises him by recalling that she
was not late on December 1, even offering explanations why she could recall
that fact about that particular date (turns 20 and 26). The ALJ is forced to
regroup and challenge her recollection as implausible. In this way the ques-
tion is actually a double-bind: if the witness answers that she does not re-
call, she plays into the category and rationale the ALJ is constructing to deny
benefits. If she answers that she does recall, however, she comes off as not
credible: how can anyone plausibly recall whether or not they were a few
minutes late nearly half a year ago? And finally, there is striking contrast
between this passage and the ALJ's failure to similarly challenge how the
City "knew" that Ms. S was late.
Mr. Williams, the attorney for HRA, also cross-examined Ms. S. He
began by picking up the ALJ's challenge to Ms. S recollection that she was
not late on December 1st:
Excerpt Ten87:
1. Williams: Is it your testimony that on December 1st, you reported to
work 10:25 a.m.?
2. Ms. S: Could have been before. Could have been 10:20. Could
have been 10:15. I'm not sure.
3. Williams: Okay. And according to time records, it states that you
appeared at 10:34. Did you note that - Did you ever review
a discrepancy?
4. Cade: Objection, Your Honor.
5. AL: What is the objection?
6. Cade: We don't have any time records.
7. ALJ: We have what we've gone through. Specifically, Mr. L tes-
tified the claimant was late to work on, a, December Ist.
And I believe it indicates the time that was recorded.
Which, I believe, was 10:34. So, we have that testimony.
So, the objection is overruled. Okay. Just repeat the ques-
tion.
In this passage, the ALJ's differing assignments of credibility to the
accounts presented by HRA and by Ms. S are made fairly explicit. Without
any time records to substantiate the alleged lateness, whether Ms. S arrived
at work late on December 1st can only be determined by evaluating credibil-
ity. As we have seen, the fact that what "he said" was presented in a rule-
16 Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
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oriented fashion, and that what "she said" was presented more as a rela-
tional account (compounded by the structural ways that the claimant's ac-
count is fragmented and diminished in a UI hearing), played a significant
part in the AL's decision who to believe.18 Of course, it may also be the
case that the ALJ simply disliked or disbelieved Ms. S for other unknowable
reasons such as her differing background and status, or for something innoc-
uous, and then he simply exploited her less powerful narrative style to help
substantiate his imminent decision against her. Either way, the ALJ actively
labored, through questioning techniques, trial management, and evidentiary
rulings, to aid the employer and to disadvantage Ms. S. Consider, as another
example, the following passage in which he helps the employer's attorney
formulate the cross-examination:
Excerpt Eleven89:
1. Williams: Okay. Let me ask you. As a supervisor, did you have any
access to look at your time or the auto time system to see
time entries?
2. Ms. S: Yes, everyone has that.
3. ALJ: - Let me - (Inaudible). When you get into work, and want
to make sure that you've been clocked in on time, that the
correct time has been recorded, can you go onto, let's say
- You worked at a terminal? You had a computer?
4. Ms. S: Yes.
5. AL: Can you go onto the computer and see what time has been
recorded?
6. Ms. S: You can.
7. ALJ: Can you do that - Like, so, you come in five minutes late.
You can go to your computer, log on, and see what time has
been recorded? Is that correct?
8. Ms. S: Yes, you can.
9. AL: Okay. That's the question. Go ahead.
10. Williams: So, basically, it would be your testimony that it would be
your responsibility to check all the time systems to insure
that the time is correct?
11. Cade: Objection, Your Honor.
12. ALJ: Now, let me just think. Let me see if we can formulate it.
Let me put it this way: Afterward, when you had swiped in,
did you check your time? Starting in - After this stipula-
tion that you signed in August 19th, 2003, when you
swiped in, did you when you got to your desk, did you look
on - Go into the auto time screen, I guess the auto time
screen, to see if you had been clocked in correctly?
" Cf JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 4 ("[La]w displays a deep gender bias in the way it
performs such basic tasks as judging credibility and defining narrative coherence.").
8 Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
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13. Ms. S: I do sometimes.
In this passage, the ALJ twice steps in to aid the employer's line of
questioning. First, in turn 3, he takes over to unpack and lay foundation for
the employer's counsel's line of questioning. Then, in turn 12, after the em-
ployer's attorney makes a grossly incorrect restatement of the claimant's tes-
timony, the ALJ does not require the attorney to rephrase the question;
rather, he reformulates and proceeds with a mini-series of questions, al-
though his version is quite different.
By the time Ms. S was allowed to frame her own story on redirect, late
in the hearing, her relational account was in full swing. In this next excerpt,
we again attempted to introduce corroborating evidence of the defective time
card:
Excerpt Twelve90:
1. ALJ: We will take this in, this memo, this E-mail, copy of an E-mail
from [Ms. S's supervisor], sent on December 9th, 2003, to
[Ms. S]. I'm taking it as Claimant's Exhibit Number Three.
2. Cade: When you sent - When you communicated to [your supervi-
sor] that you thought your card was defective at the end of
November, the beginning of December, what was - what was
his response to you?
3. Ms. S: His response was that my - my reason was not good enough.
That I should have clocked in on the card. And he was not
going to approve my time, because he didn't accept it, the
explanation.
4. Cade: How did you respond to him?
5. Ms. S: He referred me to the memo that told me to punch in on the
card, and I brought it to his attention that it was not the time
clock that was defective. It was my time card. My I.D. card,
that, in fact, was defective. And he just - He refused to - He
refused to approve my time. He said it wasn't good enough for
him. The explanation. It says it right there. I kept asking him to
do that. He didn't understand that my I.D. card was - I felt
that my I.D. card was defective, which, in fact, it was, and not
the time clock.
Consider also this excerpt, on the issue of Ms. S's PTSD:
Excerpt Thirteen 1 :
1. Cade: Ms. S, you testified that your hours had been adjusted as a
result of this conference and that you had a posttraumatic
stress disorder - (inaudible)
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3. Cade: Why did - Why did the posttraumatic stress disorder make
you late to work?
4. Ms. S: Because I couldn't be in a crowded train, or I couldn't be in a
crowded situation, as in rush hour. And I needed to come to
work when the trains were not crowded, when the buses were
not crowded.
5. Cade: Okay. Ah, and was this a medically diagnosed posttraumatic
stress disorder?
6. Ms. S: Yes, it is. It is. I was seen under the care of a doctor.
7. Cade: Okay.
8. Ms. S: Under medication.
9. Cade: Okay. Your Honor, I have a document here. (inaudible) Do
you recognize this, Ms. S?
10. Ms. S: Letter from my doctor.
The testimony in these excerpts is not only at odds with a rule-oriented
narrative style, but it conceptualizes a story that by this point is relevant to
another narrative universe than that created or accepted by the ALJ and Ms.
S's former employer. Despite the proof marshaled to demonstrate that Ms.
S's time card was faulty, and a letter from Ms. S's doctor corroborating her
fear of crowded trains, the framework established by HRA and taken up by
the ALJ through which to view Ms. S's discharge leaves no room to justify
even negligible lateness. There is administrative case law in New York
holding that discharge for absenteeism caused by a verified illness is not
misconduct despite a probation agreement that any future absences would be
cause for immediate dismissal.92 But the ALJ's focus is on whether Ms. S
voluntarily entered into a stipulation, because this renders any excuses for
lateness unimportant. In the AL's conceptual framing of the dispute, as
long as the employer is credible, there is no excuse for being even one min-
ute late. Thus, at no time during the hearing or in his written decision does
the ALJ even acknowledge the evidence presented on Ms. S's medical
illness.
After all the testimony was taken, the ALJ put on the record that he was
modifying the charges against Ms. S from "failure-to-swipe her time card"
on December 1st to the six days she was allegedly late in the months follow-
ing the probation agreement. If there was any doubt about how he was go-
ing to rule on this hearing it was removed after the following colloquy:
Excerpt Fourteen 3:
1. Cade: Your Honor. We would like a chance to review with our cli-
ent what happened on those days. In addition, we would like
to see and have a chance to look over any records provided
by the employer to substantiate -
92 A.B. 408, 972; A-750-2044, summary available at http://www.labor.state.ny.us/uilaso/
Section 1100.htm#1110.
" Transcript of Ms. S's UI Hearing (on file with author).
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2. ALJ: I'm- - I'm going to deny that. I've got the claimant's testimony
on that. I don't see the purpose of reviewing that. She's testi-
fied regarding those specific occasions. So, I'm not going to
allow that.
3. Cade: Your Honor, -
4. AL: Yes.
5. Cade: As Ms. S testified, she couldn't recall what happened on those
occasions. We'd like the chance to refresh her recollection on
what happened on those occasions.
6. ALJ: I'm not going to - I'm going to deny that. I think it should be
obvious why. I'm not going to, essentially, allow testimony
that would come after what she's already testified to would be
in my view very suspect.
The ALJ again credits the employer's story over that of Ms. S. Though
she had testified only that she could not recall, without prior notice, whether
she had been late, the ALJ seems to transform that testimony into an admis-
sion that she was in fact late (and as we see in the next section, his written
decision makes this syllogism even more explicit). His reaction to the
clinic's request for an opportunity to prepare for the charges is to suggest
that further testimony would be tainted. In the next section, I discuss the
AL's written decision and the clinic's successful appeal of that decision to
the NY DOL Appeals Board.
V. THE AL's WRITTEN DECISION AND Ms. S's APPEAL
In the AL's decision denying Ms. S's benefits after the hearing, he
wrote that the "only reasonable inference" to draw from her inability to
recall whether she was late on the days in question was that she was in fact
late. This is highly questionable as a matter of logic. One might also be
unable to recall being timely, especially when the question is about a matter
of minutes. It is troubling that an adjudicator would transform a person's
failure to recall whether she was a few minutes late many months before into
an admission of misconduct in this context. That the ALJ was aware, on
some level, of the unreasonableness of this line of questioning is illustrated
by his incredulity when Ms. S did recall that she was not late on December
1st (Excerpt Nine, turn 25). But it is well known that "judges deciding cases
often write exactly like advocates arguing them. .. ."94
What the ALJ likely intended to convey by writing that the "only rea-
sonable inference" was that Ms. S was in fact late, was that he found the
employer's account more credible than Ms. S's account. Ultimately, an adju-
dicator must render a verdict or decision. In so doing he or she necessarily
must decide between several differing accounts of what happened and side
with one of the parties. In Ms. S's case, the ALJ's ultimate task was to
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 176.
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categorize Ms. S as either in the class of persons eligible for benefits or the
class of persons not eligible for benefits. Built into this meta-goal are a
multitude of discrete categorizations. The AU had to determine whether
this was an employer whose account of the facts could be trusted, whether
this was an employee whose account could be trusted (not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive), and which portions of these accounts, if reliable, were rele-
vant. He also had to take the rhetorical steps necessary to immunize his
conclusions from doubt, for a judge writes his or her decision to be self-
justifying, by making the result uncontestable and beyond debate.95
In other words, as in most adjudications, the ALJ in Ms. S's case had to
decide between competing narratives, encompassing all the things that con-
cept conveys: discursive style, the type of story told, and the version of story
within that type. By issuing a judgment or ruling that credits one narrative
over another, the adjudicator actually completes the prevailing party's narra-
tive and negates the losers.96 Almost inevitably, the adjudicator's reactions
to the parties' narrative styles are bound up in his or her choices about what
narrative story should frame the entire debate. The "relevant facts" are de-
termined by which overall narrative the adjudicator chooses, and thus are not
simply lying in wait to be discovered and inevitably preordain the outcome
of the dispute, as Jerome Bruner and Anthony Amsterdam masterfully ar-
ticulated in their work together:
[I]ncreasingly we are coming to recognize that both the questions
and the answers in such matters of "fact" depend largely upon
one's choice (considered or unconsidered) of some overall narra-
tive as best describing what happened or how the world works....
To the extent that law is fact-contingent, it is inescapably rooted in
narrative.97
This Nietzscheian insight, that whether we consider a fact relevant may ex-
pose our values - and the cultural or political biases that lie behind them -
though probably not avoidable, should nonetheless be continually acknowl-
edged. An attorney will always do his or her best, within ethical bounds, to
present an account that invokes relevant considerations that are favorable to
her client and not to her adversary. Likewise, judges write opinions that
justify the decision rendered, and doing so always privileges a particular
version of the facts.
As in most adversarial proceedings then, the hearing considered here
presented a clash of facts interlaced with values. The deeper narrative that
Ms. S was trying to relay in her UI hearing was the story of an employee
" See DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER (Yale University Press 1988);
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 13-14 (1993).
96 See TIERSMA, supra note 30, at 148 (discussing this concept in the context of civil
litigation); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 9
(1994) (contrasting the narratives presented by the opposing lawyers who argued Brown v.
Board of Education).
9 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 111.
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who worked twenty-one years for the city, was attacked at work, and who,
as a result, developed a fear of crowded trains that affected her ability to get
to work on time. Although her employer eventually adjusted her start time,
in Ms. S's narrative, this accommodation was inadequate to prevent tardiness
from continuing to be an issue. Moreover, Ms. S believed the employer just
wanted to get rid of her, exemplified by her supervisor's failure to look into
the possibility of a defective I.D. card (and perhaps also by the employer's
willingness to terminate her for being late a total of twelve minutes over four
months, if that was indeed the basis for dismissal).98
The dialectically contrary conceptualization presented by the employer
and accepted by the AU was far simpler: Ms. S voluntarily entered into a
strict probation agreement that allowed the employer to terminate her for any
infringement of its time and leave procedures. Within this framework, any
explanations for lateness, even lateness of only one minute, are irrelevant.
Thus, undoubtedly part of why Ms. S's testimony seemed unpersuasive to
the AU is because it spoke to a narrative structure that simply called for
different facts to be relevant. Whether or not there are plausible or rational
explanations for the ALJ's decision not to grant Ms. S an adjournment to
adequately respond to the previously undisclosed allegations, he had con-
cluded that Ms. S was not in the category of persons eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits.
The clinic appealed the ALJ's decision. We argued on appeal that the
ALJ had denied Ms. S due process by not giving her a reasonable opportu-
nity to defend against newly asserted charges. We pointed out that the ALJ
had blindly accepted HRA's testimony, without requiring them to substanti-
ate these new charges or to show good cause why they had not been raised in
the first place. We argued that the more logical interpretation of Ms. S's
inability to recollect whether she was late on those occasions was that it is
unreasonable to except someone suddenly to remember, without notice,
whether they had been one to four minutes late on various days seven
months earlier. The Appeal Board reversed and remanded the ALJ's deci-
sion.9 9 Finding (in a characteristically terse decision) that the "record may
not have been sufficiently developed," the Board held that "[t]he parties
should have another opportunity to submit additional testimony on this is-
sue," with the objective that "at the end of the hearing all parties will have
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard."'"0
Regardless of whether an applicant for unemployment insurance is ulti-
mately eligible for benefits, she is nonetheless entitled to fair process, as the
New York Appeal Board recognized and affirmed in Ms. S's case. There is a
critical distinction between fair treatment and a successful outcome. As
Richard Saphire perceptively observed after Goldberg, "fairness in govern-
ment-individual relations can never be defined solely in terms of outcomes
8 The clinic's related narrative backgrounded the personal elements of Ms. S's story and
focused on the defective time card.
" In the Matter of [L.S.], A.B. No. 518704 (Aug 26, 2004) (on file with author).
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. . . rather, the processes of interaction themselves are always important in
their own right."' 0 Whether a hearing to deny unemployment benefits is
legitimate depends as much upon how the party has been treated as it does
upon whether the party was correctly awarded or denied benefits. After a
career of adjudication in administrative agencies, the Honorable Cesar A.
Perales had this insightful comment:
[I]t is more than holding hearings that fulfills the promise of
Goldberg. Not only must a hearing be impartial, but it must appear
impartial to the appellant. The appellant should leave the hearing
feeling that she had an opportunity to tell her story fully and to
have an impartial person listen to that story. The appellant must
know that the decision will be a fair one.102
VI. CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Many more Americans will appear before adjudicators in the adminis-
trative law context than will ever appear before adjudicators in the judicial
branch. The benefits, rights, and responsibilities that are decided by the ad-
ministrative state frequently have profound effects on individual lives. With
unemployment currently at record high levels in the United States, 03 it is
critical that claimants be fairly evaluated and actually heard, even when their
narrative style does not conform to rule-oriented discourse.
This paper explored the ways in which the particular linguistic phenom-
ena occurring during Ms. S's administrative law hearing both reflected and
influenced the power dynamics involved in the dispute, ultimately implicat-
ing constitutional concerns about the fairness of her hearing. Limited to the
analysis of a single hearing, this Article is merely one illustration of the
relationship between biases about narrative styles and administrative due
process, and we must continue to describe in detail how language-use can
affect the playing field in the administrative state. Sociolinguistic analysis
of the "mechanics of domination and privilege," Conley and O'Barr argue,
is crucial if we wish to challenge the subordination of those who do not
speak the language privileged by adjudicators. 1" Of course, it may prove
just as useful to closely study the linguistic phenomena in hearings where
1o' Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. Ill, 124 (1978). See also Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
102 Perales, supra note 8, at 891-92.
'0 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, available
at http://data.bis.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServiet?datatool= latestnumbers&series_
id=LNS14000000.
" JUST WORDS, supra note 12, at 76 ("Because it is at the level of language-in-action that
abstractions such as patriarchy become reality, linguistic analysis is of more than academic
interest. Those who would transform the law's patriarchy are probably wasting their time un-
less they are prepared to challenge the practices that both reflect and reproduce it.").
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the ALJ does not demonstrate (or act on) biases against less-favored narra-
tive styles. 0
That Ms. S has not acquired the skill of presenting a rule-oriented ac-
count was to her significant detriment, despite the fact that she was repre-
sented by counsel. Ms. S's adversary, on the other hand, was authoritative,
was able to marshal a chronological, cause-and-effect account, and presented
details that were relevant to this account. While one cannot ascertain to a
certainty the extent to which these differing styles of persuasion affected the
ALJ's assessment of credibility, the effect clearly was not negligible. The
hard reality is that adversarial proceedings are more about winning than
truth, and in Matoesian's formulation, legal victories "depen[d] on which
side best wields language as an instrument of persuasion, of domination."' 06
Moreover, in an administrative hearing, no less than in a judicial courtroom,
the consequences can be considerable; without the assistance of counsel Ms.
S likely would not have appealed the ALJ's decision and the failure to pro-
vide due process would not have been remedied.
One commentator has lauded that "[g]iven their advanced education,
familiarity with the subject matter, forensic ability, and experience, ALJs
can perform the required credibility determinations with uncommon
skill." 0 But if ALJs are not sensitive enough to cultural and narrative dif-
ferences, they may err when presented with a claimant like Ms. S, who does
not organize her narrative like those exposed to professional cultures such as
law, medicine, or business. The point is not merely that advocates need to
help their clients speak the language of the court (although a close examina-
tion of exactly how an adjudicator's assessments of credibility and treatment
of parties are influenced by narrative and discursive styles will certainly aid
in that endeavor'). Policy makers, administrative agencies, and ALJs them-
selves should understand how biases about language may influence entitle-
ments adjudications, regardless of whether or not such biases are ultimately
unavoidable.
Jane Rutherford urges us to ensure that those parties who do not hold
powerful tools can still participate on an equal footing,10 9 and I believe that
there are ways that unemployment insurance benefits hearings (and other
o As Steven Winter observed in his critique of MINDING THE LAW, "one does not profita-
bly study a phenomenon by observing only those portions of it with which one disagrees and
about which one has strong feelings." Steven L. Winter, Making the Familiar Conventional
Again, 99 MicH. L. REv. 1607, 1611-12 (2001).
" MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY, supra note 13, at 30.
0o7 Christopher B. McNeil, Critical Factors of Adjudication: Language and the Adjudica-
tion Process in Executive and Judicial Branch Decisions, 23 J. NATL A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES
411, 414 (2003).
"o My own experiences with this endeavor, which began with my work in this clinic and
continued through years of practice in immigration courts, is that it can be a psychically jarring
process for both the client and the attorney. See generally Alfieri, supra note 2; see also Clark
D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law As Language, 87 MIcH. L. REv.
2459 (1989).
109 Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1992).
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administrative hearings) can become more egalitarian. First, the current
structure of the hearings is too heavily weighted in favor of the employer, in
that the employer is given the initial and principle opportunity to define the
legal issues and the facts. This imbalance is especially felt where, as in the
hearing explored here, the employer is a major institutional player. The fact
that opening arguments are permitted is not sufficient to ameliorate the prob-
lem. For one thing, most employees are pro se, and are wholly inexperi-
enced with administrative hearings (and therefore are unlikely to be able to
marshal rule-oriented, effective opening arguments), whereas employers, es-
pecially repeat players like city agencies, will be much more familiar with
the law and practice of contested hearings and will be able to articulate op-
position in language and through legal claims that are familiar to the ALJ.
As Professor Baldacci and others have suggested, the issue is not solely
about chronology; it is about the ALJ's deference to the more powerful
party's "presentation of the issues as the sole lens through which the eviden-
tiary hearing is seen.""o
To avoid this, the structure of these hearings must be modified to allow
the applicants to participate earlier and more significantly in the initial fram-
ing of the issues. For example, before proceeding to test evidence or credi-
bility through questioning, the AU could give each party the opportunity to
fully state his or her legal claim, alternating back and forth between the
parties as needed. The AU may have to employ "modalities of interven-
tion" - solicitation through non-leading questions, summarization, indica-
tion of where narrative should begin and end, etc. - to assist the claimant
with this issue-defining stage of the process."' The ALJ should then attempt
to ensure that the claimant understands the former employer's version, and
solicit any relevant defenses to explore. Finally, the AU should explicitly
define the issues by summarizing and restating each side's claims and
defenses.
Second, ALJs should limit their use of leading questions and other ad-
versarial cross-examination forms with claimants. This is not to suggest that
they should not probe for the truth, but as we have seen, this form of ques-
tioning frequently does not allow claimants a full enough opportunity to get
their story onto the record, and it has the effect of reinforcing unequal power
dynamics and reproducing hierarchical social structures. Finally, and under-
lying both of the above recommendations, ALJs need far more training on
issues of cultural and narrative difference.
My hope is that the case study considered here does more than illustrate
the fact that judges might prefer one style of narrative over another. It
reveals an important consequence of those preferences: When adjudicators
"o Baldacci, supra note 2 , at 474-75, n. 75.
.. Baldacci, supra note 2, at 475-78 (reviewing suggestions from commentators on the
ways judges can help pro se witnesses more effectively convey information).
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marginalize people's narrative styles too much, they may violate constitu-
tional rights. Administrative due process - justice - should require that ap-
plicants are not only given a chance to speak, but are actually heard.

